California Water Reallocation: Where'd You Get That?

Natural Resources Journal (University of New Mexico) | March 8th, 2017

When thirsty, Californians often avoid going to the market for more water. Instead, they might borrow some from their rich neighbors, they might sue them or more commonly

When thirsty, Californians often avoid going to the market for more water. Instead, they might borrow some from their rich neighbors, they might sue them or more commonly, they simply take more from users without much of a voice (e.g. the fish or future generations). These alternatives are often superior to using markets. Within markets, a surprising detail emerges – it is uncommon for farmers to fallow fields in order to sell water to another user. Rather, many water transfers are structured so sellers can have their cake and eat it too. While some of these transfers rightly bring about jealousy and criticism, they likely do facilitate efficient water use. In discussing these points, I provide a more holistic description of how water users reallocate water as well as a richer understanding of how California’s water market actually works.

California’s First Farmer-Led Groundwater Market

Nature Conservancy | July 12th, 2018

Ventura County, located in California’s south coast, is one of United States’ most productive agricultural counties (ranked 10th in California and 11th in th

Ventura County, located in California’s south coast, is one of United States’ most productive agricultural counties (ranked 10th in California and 11th in the US)1, with agricultural production valued at $2.1B in 2016.2 California’s landmark groundwater law, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), requires that 127 groundwater basins, including those in Ventura County, develop Groundwater Sustainability Plans that ensure pumping within sustainable limits. In western Ventura County, where over 70 percent of groundwater use is agricultural, the California Department of Water Resources has designated two groundwater basins as being in critical overdraft under SGMA. The local management agency may have to reduce groundwater use in these basins by as much as 40 percent to achieve a sustainable yield. While these reductions are critical to achieving long-term sustainability of water use, which includes nature’s needs, they also pose significant challenges to wisely managing reduced water allocations to keep irrigated agricultural land in production. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) has a vested interest in preserving farming in the county because it buffers important river and wetland habitat from nearby urban lands. Growers in the region quickly identified water markets as an important tool for managing limited groundwater resources.

Colorado River Basin August 2022 24-Month Study

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) | August 16th, 2022

Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization

United States Congress | April 16th, 2019

Authorized Drought Contingency Plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins, which required reduced Lower Basin deliveries beyond previous curtailment plans

Authorized Drought Contingency Plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins, which required reduced Lower Basin deliveries beyond previous curtailment plans at specified Lake Mead storage levels, committed Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and put in place plans to coordinate Upper Basin operations to enhance Lake Powell storage levels and prevent the loss of hydropower generation.

Colorado River Shortage FAQs

Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) | August 1st, 2022

Comparing Local Groundwater Withdrawal Permitting Laws in the Southwest and California

Stanford University | October 13th, 2016

 For the first time in California’s history, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014 (SGMA) aims to empower local agencies to sustainably manage the pumping

 For the first time in California’s history, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014 (SGMA) aims to empower local agencies to sustainably manage the pumping of groundwater. A notable, but often unremarked, aspect of SGMA is that it provides Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) with the power to adopt rules and regulations to establish “groundwater extraction allocations” (i.e., a permitting regime). California is the last of the seven southwest states — Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah — to introduce a permitting power, suggesting that the other southwestern states can inform GSAs looking to promote sustainability through the use of their new power to establish extraction allocations. 

Developing the Next Framework to Manage the Colorado River: Flexible Tools to Benefit Tribes and the Basin

Water and Tribes Initiative | August 2nd, 2022

Economic Efficiency of Water Use and Allocation in California: A Scoping-Level Analysis

Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force (Delta Vision) | July 1st, 2008

This report identifies key issues related to the economic efficiency of water development, allocation and use in California and discusses general policy changes that migh

This report identifies key issues related to the economic efficiency of water development, allocation and use in California and discusses general policy changes that might improve economic efficiency. Policy options focus on water pricing, water transfers, water use efficiency (i.e, conservation) and State development and enforcement policies. Analysis is provided at a scoping level of detail. Some important empirical issues that weigh on the relative merits of potential policy changes are not addressed. Efficiency of water use has never been more important in California. There is a need to save water and money. California has recently made progress in improved economic efficiency of water use, but major issues remain. Also, recent changes in the amount and location of supplies suggest a review of allocation efficiency. There are two important efficiency topics that this paper does not address in detail. First, economic efficiency of water use for ecosystem purposes is a viable concept, but it is difficult to apply given the state of Delta ecosystem science and the current range of possible futures. We can not quantify the relationship between water and ecosystem functions and values. Therefore, our ability to prescribe efficiency changes related to Delta water for ecosystem purposes is limited. Second, this paper also does not address the economic efficiency of major new storage or Delta conveyance facilities. The efficiency of specific water supply projects including regional or local conjunctive use and groundwater storage projects are also not considered. These are being addressed in different forums. This report focuses on other types of uses, allocations and development of water. A variety of potential actions and policies that might improve efficiency in the allocation, use and development of water resources are discussed. Some of the efficiency issues are • Are water allocations under California’s water rights systems efficient? • If there are inefficiencies, could an effective water transfer market increase efficiency? • Are there barriers or constraints to water transfer markets that should be removed? • How could water pricing be changed to increase efficiency? • How could California encourage efficiency in the use and development of water through incentives such as grants and loans, and through enforcement? In all cases, our findings represent potential improvements from the perspective of economic efficiency alone. There are usually other, non-economic considerations which would play into the larger question of the laws and policies that might be changed.

Effective Implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine in California Water Resources Decision-Making: A View From the Bench

University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley) | April 12th, 2012

Forty years ago, in his seminal law review article on the public trust doctrine, Professor Joseph L. Sax suggested that “citizens seeking to develop a comprehen

Forty years ago, in his seminal law review article on the public trust doctrine, Professor Joseph L. Sax suggested that “citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems” could use the public trust doctrine to obtain “effective judicial intervention” where “legislative response and administrative action” had been inconsistent. Of course, water is one of the natural resources to which the public trust doctrine is, and always has been, particularly applicable. And yet, it was not until ten years after Professor Sax published his article that Professor Ralph W. Johnson first predicted an impending “collision” between “[t]he public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system . . . in the West.” The imminence of that collision — in California at least — was due in no small part to the National Audubon Society’s then-pending suit against the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles (“L.A. Water and Power”) to limit diversions from the streams feeding Mono Lake.  That suit, which was a prime example of the sort of public interest litigation Professor Sax had advocated in his article, led to the California Supreme Court’s seminal decision in National Audubon, in which the court announced that “[t]he state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect the public trust uses whenever feasible.” Today, twenty-eight years after the decision in National Audubon and more than forty years after Professor Sax’s article, what have we learned about the use of the public trust doctrine in water resources decision-making in California? Has it been an effective tool for obtaining judicial intervention in the decision-making process, as Professor Sax suggested it could be? And, more importantly, is judicial intervention the best way to effectuate and protect public trust values in the state’s water resources? Those are some of the questions I seek to answer in this Article.

Estuary News, April 2004

San Francisco Estuary Partnership (SFEP) | April 15th, 2004