Document Details

Independent Forensic Team Report: Oroville Dam Spillway Incident

John Trojanowski, Stephen Rigbey, John France, Henry T. Falvey, Peter A. Dickson, Irfan A. Alvi | January 5th, 2018


The Oroville Dam spillway incident was caused by a long-term systemic failure of the California Department of Water Resources (DWR), regulatory, and general industry practices to recognize and address inherent spillway design and construction weaknesses, poor bedrock quality, and deteriorated service spillway chute conditions. The incident cannot reasonably be “blamed” mainly on any one individual, group, or organization.

During service spillway operation on February 7, 2017, water injection through both cracks and joints in the chute slab resulted in uplift forces beneath the slab that exceeded the uplift capacity and structural strength of the slab, at a location along the steep section of the chute . The uplifted slab section exposed the underlying poor quality foundation rock at that location to unexpected severe erosion, resulting in removal of additional slab sections and more erosion .

Responding to the damage to the service spillway chute necessitated difficult risk tradeoffs while the lake continued to rise. The resulting decisions, made without a full understanding of relative uncertainties and consequences, allowed the reservoir level to rise above the emergency spillway weir for the first time in the project’s history, leading to severe and rapid erosion downstream of the weir and, ultimately, the evacuation order.

. . . There were many opportunities to intervene and prevent the incident , but the overall system of interconnected factors operated in a way that these opportunities were missed. Numerous human , organizational, and industry factors led to the physical factors not being recognized and properly addressed, and to the decision-making during the incident.

Keywords

infrastructure